Epistemic Luck and the Extended Mind

Contemporary debates about epistemic luck and its relation to knowledge have traditionally proceeded against a tacit background commitment to cognitive internalism, the thesis that cognitive processes play out inside the head. In particular, safety-based approaches (e.g., Pritchard 2005; 2007; Luper-Foy 1984; Sainsbury 1997; Sosa 1999; Williamson 2000) reveal this commitment by taking for granted a traditional internalist construal of what I call the cognitive fixedness thesis—viz., the thesis that the cognitive process that is being employed in the actual world is always ‘held fixed’ when we go out to nearby possible worlds to assess whether the target belief is lucky in a way that is incompatible with knowledge. However, for those inclined to replace cognitive internalism with the extended mind thesis (e.g., Clark and Chalmers 1998), a very different, ‘active externalist’ version of the cognitive fixedness thesis becomes the relevant one for the purposes of assessing a belief’s safety. The aim here will be to develop this point in a way that draws out some of the important ramifications it has for how we think about safety, luck and knowledge

H.R. 200, the Helping Families Save Their Homes in Bankruptcy Act of 2009, and H.R. 225, the Emergency Homeownership and Equity Protection Act : Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong., Jan. 22, 2009 (Statement of Associate Professor Adam J. Levitin, Geo. U. L. Center)

Permitting modification of all mortgages in bankruptcy would create a low-cost, effective, fair, and immediately available method for resolving much of the current foreclosure crisis without imposing costs on taxpayers, creating a moral hazard for borrowers or lenders, or increasing mortgage credit costs or decreasing mortgage credit availability. As the foreclosure crisis deepens, bankruptcy modification presents the best and least invasive method of stabilizing the housing market and is a crucial step in stabilizing financial markets

Problems in Mortgage Servicing from Modification to Foreclosure: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong., Nov. 16, 2010 (Statement of Associate Professor Adam J. Levitin, Geo. U. L. Center)

The mortgage foreclosure process is beset by a variety of problems. These range from procedural defects (including, but not limited to robosigning) to outright counterfeiting of documents to questions about the validity of private-label mortgage securitizations that could mean that these mortgage-backed securities are not actually backed by any mortgages whatsoever. While the extent of these problems is unknown at present, the evidence is mounting that it is not limited to one-off cases, but that there may be pervasive defects throughout the foreclosure and securitization processes. The problems in the mortgage market are highly technical, but they are extremely serious. At best they present problems of fraud on the court, clouded title to property, and delay in foreclosures that will increase the shadow housing inventory and drive down home prices. At worst, they represent a systemic risk of liabilities in the trillions of dollars, greatly exceeding the capital of the US’s major financial institutions. Congress would do well to ensure that federal regulators are undertaking a thorough investigation of foreclosure problems and to consider the possibilities for a global settlement of foreclosure problems, loan modifications, and the housing debt overhang that stagnate the economy and pose potential systemic risk

The Paper Chase: Securitization, Foreclosure, and the Uncertainty of Mortgage Title

The mortgage foreclosure crisis raises legal questions as important as its economic impact. Questions that were straightforward and uncontroversial a generation ago today threaten the stability of a $13 trillion mortgage market: Who has standing to foreclose? If a foreclosure was done improperly, what is the effect? And what is the proper legal method for transferring mortgages? These questions implicate the clarity of title for property nationwide and pose a too-big-to-fail problem for the courts. The legal confusion stems from the existence of competing systems for establishing title to mortgages and transferring those rights. Historically, mortgage title was established and transferred through the public demonstration regimes of UCC Article 3 and land recordation systems. This arrangement worked satisfactorily when mortgages were rarely transferred. Mortgage finance, however, shifted to securitization, which involves repeated bulk transfers of mortgages. To facilitate securitization, deal architects developed alternative contracting regimes for mortgage title: UCC Article 9 and MERS, a private mortgage registry. These new regimes reduced the cost of securitization by dispensing with demonstrative formalities, but at the expense of reduced clarity of title, which raised the costs of mortgage enforcement. This trade-off benefitted the securitization industry at the expense of securitization investors because it became apparent only subsequently with the rise in mortgage foreclosures. The harm, however, has not been limited to securitization investors. Clouded mortgage title has significant negative externalities on the economy as a whole. This Article proposes reconciling the competing title systems through an integrated system of note registration and mortgage recordation, with compliance as a prerequisite to foreclosure. Such a system would resolve questions about standing, remove the potential cloud to real-estate title, and facilitate mortgage financing by clarifying property rights

New host records of chewing lice (Mallophaga) on birds in Florida 2

This is a continuation of Holt (2004). Methods and sources of specimens are as reported in that paper. Representatives of all records below are deposited in the Florida State Collection of Arthropods and/or the author's collection

The Unlit Path Behind the House by Margo Wheaton

Review of Margo Wheaton\u27s The Unlit Path Behind the House